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1 December 1952

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Intelligence Requirements for HOPE CHEST

PARTICIPANTS: Messrs. Klein and Nichols, Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Air Force
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Messrs. [redacted], CCI
Mr. Reber, CIC

1. Messrs. Klein and Nichols called to discuss requirements bearing upon the watching process which would be relevant in the development of the Air Force project HOPE CHEST. Their concern seemed to be with the kinds of indicators useful at some future time, say 1960 (when the Air Force might have developed some means of observation or detection over Soviet or Satellite territory), which would be most likely to give evidence of Soviet intentions to attack. They were thinking in terms of 24-hour alert.

2. It was stated that this had been discussed briefly with AFODIN, but not with AFODIN, CII, and G-2 in terms of their providing assistance on this problem.

3. The CIA representatives proposed that the most appropriate way to approach this matter would be through the AFODIN and the other military intelligence agencies who might think it desirable to raise this matter in the Watch Committee. They agreed to explore this approach. I indicated that in the event this was not fruitful, the Agency might consider calling together representatives of the IAC to discuss the matter, but this was distinctly our second choice.

4. The gentlemen seemed to be bothered by another question, somewhat nebulous, but as I understand it: how can we be sure that those responsible for operations and policy will, in fact, take action on the basis of intelligence collected by the unique means which may be developed. I stated that I knew of no way for intelligence to aid in ensuring that such would be the case either now or in the future, except through the assembly of additional confirming sources.

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JAMES Q. REEDER
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination

cc: DD/I

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